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Abstract
This paper focuses on the evolving pattern of fiscal decentralization and its impact on the
growth of per capita GDP of the districts in Nepal. The dependent variable is the growth of
the per capita district agricultural GDP, which is, used as a proxy for the annual growth of per
capita district GDP growth. The revenue and expenditure indices have been used as the fiscal
decentralization variables. The paper also uses a dummy variable for the Local Self
Governance Act (LSGA) as a fiscal decentralization variable. From the various regressions, it
is found that fiscal decentralization has positively influenced the per capita district GDP
growth. The coefficient of fiscal decentralization variables and dummy variable for the
LSGA are statistically significant and positive. The relationship is robust. It is conclude that,
ceteris paribus, fiscal decentralization is supportive to district per capita GDP growth in
Nepal.
Key words: Fiscal Decentralization, District Economic Growth, Local Bodies, LSGA
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1. Introduction
Decentralization is generally defined as the transfer of certain administrative and fiscal
functions or powers from the central to local authorities. There has been a worldwide interest
in decentralization in all parts of the world. Both developed and developing countries are
attempting to challenge central governments’ monopoly of decision-making power. In the
Western world, decentralization is an effective tool for reorganization of the government in
order to provide public services cost effectively (Bennett, 1990, Wildasin, 1997). Developing
countries are turning to decentralization to escape from the traps of ineffective and inefficient
governance, macroeconomic instability, and inadequate economic growth (Bird and
Vaillancourt, 1999).
Fiscal decentralization or the devolution of fiscal power from the national government to subnational governments constitutes part of reform packages aimed at improving efficiency of
the public sector, increasing competition among sub-national governments in delivering
public services and stimulating economic growth (Bahl and Linn, 1992). It consists primarily
of devolving revenue sources and expenditure functions to lower tiers of government. It
boosts public sector efficiency and enhances accountability and transparency in service
delivery and policy-making bringing the government closer to the people.
Nepal introduced the process of decentralization in the early 1960s to mobilize citizen
participation in the development process. In 1962, the Government introduced a
decentralization policy framework. A legal framework for decentralization was introduced
with the Decentralization Act of 1982 and Decentralization Regulations of 1984. After the
restoration of multiparty democratic system in 1990, three separate Acts, namely the District
Development Committees (DDCs) Act, Village Development Committee (VDCs) Act, and
Municipality (Muns) Act, were enacted. In 1991, Local Bodies (LBs)2 were constituted in
accordance with these Acts. These acts defined the organizational structures, election process,
tasks and functions of the LBs. Based on these acts, the first local election was held in 1992,
2

The term Local Bodies (LBs) is used for the Local Governments (LGs) in Nepal that include the
Village Development Committees (VDCs), Municipalities (Muns) and District Development
Committees (DDCs). The DDCs function as a middle tier between the central government and
VDCs/Muns, whereas the VDCs and Muns serve as units of Local Governments in rural and urban
areas respectively.
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which was followed by the establishment of a fiscal transfer system in 1994. Subsequently in
1999, the Government consolidated its local governance system by enacting the Local Self
Governance Act (LSGA, 1999), which replaced the erstwhile separate acts for village,
municipality and the district levels, incorporating some of their provisions. The LSGA gives
LBs greater political, administrative and financial powers to lead, facilitate, and manage the
local development affairs effectively. Thus, Nepal introduced decentralization in more
operational form in 1999. There has been no amendment to this Act since 1999.
The LSGA (1999), the Local Self Governance Regulations (LSGR, 2000) and the
Local Bodies Financial Administrations Regulations (LBFAR, 2007) lay the legal basis for
the current local government structure in Nepal. These act and regulations define the LBs’
expenditure and revenue functions (Appendices 1 and 2), ensure the fixed entitlement grants
from the government and provide the underpinnings for local autonomy in planning and
budgeting.
The LSGA was an unprecedented policy shift, as it legally endorsed the concept of selfgovernance and devolution of authority to the LBs. Its provisions have empowered the LBs
and made them more accountable for local development activities. It has devolved different
functions such as social, economic, physical infrastructure development, poverty reduction,
environment management, and sectoral functions, including planning, financial management,
coordination, monitoring, and reporting to the DDCs, VDCs and Muns3.
The LSGA empowers the LBs to raise their revenue from a number of sources such as fees
and charges, local own source taxes, shared taxes, and intergovernmental transfers. Rates for
most of the local governments' revenues (tax, service fees, fines etc.) are defined centrally,
although, in some cases, the LBs can define their own rates within prescribed limits. In
addition, there are a number of shared revenues, both between tiers of the LBs and between
the LBs and the central government, though they are not without problems.
Intergovernmental transfers play the dominant role in the LB’s overall budget (LBFC, 2012).
The LSGA aimed to enhance the performance and efficiency of local bodies in resource
mobilization and management. It expected to contribute to institutionalization of poverty
3

Until decisions are made about the future local governments' structure in a federal system, there are 75 DDCs,
3915 VDCs and 58 Municipalities in Nepal. The VDCs vary considerably in size and complexity. Areas vary
from around 1 square kilometer to 1500 square kilometer, while population varies 71 to nearly 9 millions. The
situation of DDCs and Muns is more or less the same.

3

4

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

alleviation and sustainable development at the local level. The LSGA also provided local
people with the rights of direct involvement and participation in decision-making and
planning process from the grassroots level. The preamble of LSGA (1999) clearly states that
it sought to:
"Make provisions conducive to the enjoyment of the fruits of democracy through the
utmost participation of the sovereign people in the process of governance by way of
decentralization,
Institutionalize the process of development by promoting the participation of all the
people including the ethnic community, indigenous people and downtrodden as well as
socially and economically backward groups in bringing out social equality in mobilizing
and allocating means for the development of their own region and in the balanced and
equal distribution of the fruits of development,
Have institutional development of local bodies capable of bearing responsibility, by
providing such responsibility and power at the local level as is necessary to formulate
and execute plans, and
Constitute local bodies for the development of the local self-governance system in a
manner that they are able to make decisions on the matters affecting daily needs and lives
of the people by developing local leadership. "
But in practice, there are several problems. The LBs are not exercising several functions
assigned to them in accordance with the LSGA (1999) . Due to lack of clarity and the
resulting confusion, and due to limited local resources and absorptive capacity, the LBs tend
to see the expenditure assignments as mere permissive than mandatory. The LBs tend to
selectively choose those responsibilities that are easier to implement with minimal
accountability. The long absence of elected political representation since 2002 has not
permitted the LBs to use full-fledged devolution. The LBs assume that the central
government will continue to provide the core services such as those on education, health,
roads, agriculture, and environmental management, which were historically the responsibility
of the central line departments. Most LBs focus on expenditures linked to durable assets like
roads, bridges and buildings, as opposed to softer services such as awareness campaigns to
primary education, primary health, drinking water, sanitation, etc. LGCDP (2011) makes
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clear that, out of total LBs’ investment 40% goes in road building. Some estimates show the
ratio to be even higher at 60% (Koirala, 2011).
Some 23 sectoral laws contradict the provisions of LSGA creating confusion on roles to be
played by the LBs in coordinating and liaising with different line offices at the local level. These
contradictions undermine the LBs in implementing their functions. The Ministry of Federal
Affairs and Local Development has raised these issues in different forums, but they still remain
unresolved (Kelly, 2011 ).
Despite these challenges, the LBs have been able to begin providing important governance
interface at the local level and playing a key role in local economic development. They are
providing accessible governance for local residents, facilitating communication, and creating
a sense of participation and ownership in the governance process. The LBs have helped
identify local priorities, execute local plan and budget, and play a supportive role in
delivering key public services such as primary healthcare, primary education, local feeder
roads, and agricultural services, among others. The LBs have been able to develop some local
physical infrastructure such as roads, drinking water projects, school and community
buildings, canals, etc., using funds they receive from the central government and their own
resources, which they collect in the form of local taxes, service fees, etc.
The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization on
district economic growth using a set of fiscal decentralization measures, namely expenditure
decentralization, revenue decentralization and the LSGA. In addition, this paper also intends
to address the gaps overlooked by the previous studies in exploring the influence of the
LSGA in Nepal. Adopting empirical analysis slightly different from the approach employed
in other similar studies, the estimation results of this paper show that the influence of fiscal
decentralization is positive to the district GDP growth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature. Section 3
illustrates the research methodology. Section 4 elaborates on regression results and analysis.
Section 5 presents policy implications and finally, section 6 highlights the conclusion.

5
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2. Review of Literature
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), and Oates (1972) originally made arguments in favour of
fiscal decentralization. Their basic economic arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization
rest on two assumptions. First, decentralization will increase economic efficiency, as local
governments are capable of providing better services due to proximity and informational
advantages. Second, competition and population mobility across local governments for the
delivery of public services will ensure the right matching of preferences between local
communities and local governments (Tiebout, 1956). There is, however, little empirical
support to substantiate the claims of the economic benefits of fiscal decentralization
(Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004).
Musgrave (1959) suggested separating the functions of government into three branches,
namely macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and resource allocation. He
argued that, these functions should be shared amongst the tiers of government in order to use
the resources efficiently. The stabilization branch is to assure the achievement of high
employment and price stability; the distribution branch is to achieve an equitable distribution
of income; and the allocation branch is to see that resources are used efficiently. Literature on
fiscal decentralization and economic growth implicitly assumes that fiscal decentralization
affects growth through its impact on these three functions (McLure, 1999). The LBFC
(2000) argues that among the three functions, the resource allocation function is considered
the most appropriate one for the Local Governments.
Oates (1972) proposed a straightforward decentralization theorem that formalizes the basic
efficiency argument for the decentralized provision of certain types of public goods. His
theorem lays out a set of sufficient conditions for the decentralized provision of these goods
to be Pareto-superior to a centralized determination of public outputs. He applied his theorem
for a public good–the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the total
population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in each
jurisdiction are the same for the central or for the respective local government. He inferred
that it will always be more efficient (or at at least as efficient) for local governments to
provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the
central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all
jurisdictions.
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Oates (1993) argues that the basic economic case for fiscal decentralization is the
enhancement of economic efficiency, and that the provision of local outputs that are
differentiated according to local tastes and circumstances results in higher levels of social
welfare than centrally determined and more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions.
According to Oates, expenditure for infrastructure and the social sector that respond to
regional or local differences are likely to be more effective in enhancing economic
development than the central policies.
There has been a growing interest of development specialists, multilateral development
agencies, economists, and governments on fiscal decentralization as a primary tool for
promoting economic growth (United Nations, 1991;, Oates, 1994, Bruno and Pleskovic,
1996). However, the literature on decentralization and economic growth in the context of
development is still in its infancy (Bardhan, 2002).
Linking economic growth and fiscal decentralization together has mainly three reasons
(Zhang and Zou, 1998). Firstly, growth is an objective of fiscal decentralization and a factor
of efficiency in the allocation of resources in the public sector. Secondly, it is an explicit
intention of governments to adopt policies that lead to a sustained increase in per capita
income. Thirdly, per capita growth is easier to measure and interpret than other indicators of
economic performance.
Out of 75 developing and emerging economies with populations greater than five million, all
but 12 claim to have embarked on some type of transfer of power to local governments
(Dillinger, 1994).

Some 95 percent of democracies now have elected sub-national

governments, and countries everywhere—large and small, rich and poor—are devolving
political, fiscal, and administrative powers to sub-national tiers of government (World Bank,
2000).
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) point out that fiscal decentralization has the potential to
improve economic growth and that it offers a potentially powerful tool for alleviating
poverty. A review of the experience in various countries suggests that the success or failure
of decentralization often depends upon a coherent decentralization strategy, and adequate
mechanisms for managing and implementing the process. That process often includes
multiple reform components, divergent interests (among central vs. local governments,
sectoral ministries vs. central agencies, bureaucrats vs., politicians vs. citizens, etc.).
7
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The rapid growth in the autonomy and responsibilities of subnational governments is one of
the most noteworthy trends in governance in recent decades, especially in developing and
transition economies (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), in which fiscal decentralization tends
to be a relatively recent phenomenon. In these countries, the two main reasons for the
emergence of decentralization are either the failures in economic planning of the central
governments, and/or the changing international economic and political conditions (Smoke,
2001). In case of Nepal, decentralization is the major area of governance reform, an
important tool for improvement in service delivery and capacity development at local levels.
Subedi (2013) argues that the past efforts of governance reform and decentralization in Nepal
could not devolve adequate fiscal resource to the LBs. Currently, Nepal is in political
transition. People are demanding more power. Decentralizing power and localizing services
are the key reform agenda.
There have been many studies on the growing theoretical literature that explore the
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. However, there have been
relatively fewer empirical studies to establish such relationship. Studies undertaken so far
have been reaching diverging conclusions, showing from positive, to neutral and negative
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
Most empirical studies highlight a positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth, the majority of which are cross-country analyses. These include studies on
the OECD countries (Thiessen, 2003, Thornton, 2007 and Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz, 2009
), European countries including transition countries (Meloche, Vaillacourt and Yilmaz, 2004
and Ebel , Yilmaz, 2004

and Krøijer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2009) and

developed and

developing countries (Martinez-Vazquet J. and Robert McNab, 2005 and Iimi, 2005). Single
country studies also find positive relation such in the case of the United States and China
(Akai and Sakata, 2002 , Stansel, 2005 , Lin and Lou, 2000, and Hammond and Tosum,
2009). These studies find the theoretically predicated contribution of fiscal decentralization to
economic growth. These studies conclude that fiscal decentralization contributes positively to
economic growth.
A few studies find no significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth. Some of those studies use data from the LDCs (Woller and Phillips, 1998), US
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Metropolitan and Non-metropolitan cities (Hammond and Tosun, 2006), OECD countries
(Baskaran and Feld ,2009) and Australia (Bodman, Campbell, Kelly and Hodge, 2009).
At the same time, some studies find negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth. They use data set from both developed and developing countries (Davoodi
and Zou, 1998), Chinese provinces (Zhang and Zou, 1998, and Jin and Zou, 2005), US
economy (Xie, Zou and Davoodi, 1999),

and

OECD countries

(Rodríguez-Pose and

Ezcurra, 2010). All these studies conclude that the influence of fiscal decentralization on
economic growth is negative. These studies argue that fiscal decentralization may be
particularly harmful for economic growth in the early stages of development, where the
administrative capability of local governments is insufficient; where local officials may not
be responsive to preferences of local residents; and where the local governments may be
constrained by the central government. Likewise, fiscal policy-growth effects may be more
related to the functional composition of government spending or type of tax than to fiscal
decentralization, if sub-national governments spend more on items with low growth effects
such as social welfare whereas national governments spend more in growth enhancing items
such as infrastructure ( Gemmell, Richard and Ismael, 2009).
In case of Nepal, there have been very few studies showing empirical relationship between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Shrestha and Devkota (2010), Gyanwaly and
Devkota (2012) and Devkota (2013) directly or indirectly find positive relationship between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. These studies explicitly ignore the role and
importance of the LSGA along with its impacts in local economy. They have overlooked the
pre and post LSGA analysis approach, which is a necessary condition. It has created the need
to address these gaps and hence the importance of this study.

9

10

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

3. Research Methodology
The LSGA (1999) is a major attempt to implement the fiscal decentralization. In this study,
panel data for the period 1996 to 2001 have been used to examine the impact of fiscal
decentralization on economic growth in districts. This includes a period of three years before
and a period of three years after the enactment of LSGA. The sample could not be extended
beyond 2001 due to insufficient data availability. Due to the unavailability of data on district
level per capita GDP growth, the district agricultural GDP growth is taken as the proxy.
Data have been collected from published and unpublished sources from concerned Local
Bodies (LBs), the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), the Local
Bodies Fiscal Commission (LBFC) and other related institutions. All the data related to
revenue and expenditure have been converted to constant price (base year 1996) using a price
deflator.
Nepal’s 75 districts have been grouped into five strata - eastern, central, western, mid western
and far western- as per the existing development classification of the country. Each of these
five strata is regrouped into three sub-strata: Terai, Hill and Mountain, according to the
geographical division of the country. Four districts from each development stratum have been
selected. Within these five strata, one district is selected from the Terai and the Mountain
sub-stratum each and two districts have been chosen from the Hill sub-stratum. Thus, 20
districts have been selected as the sample of the study.
While selecting the districts from each sub-stratum, criteria including the Human
Development Index (UNDP, 2004), Own Source Revenue (LBFC, 2010), Performance
Measurements4 (LBFC, 2011) and population (CBS, 2009) have been applied. The sampled
20 districts (Appendix 3) capture 26.67 percent of the 75 districts, covering 29.13 percent of
total country's population based on 2011 census.
In this paper, many variables such as total revenue and expenditure, population, and number
of primary schools at the district level, DDCs expenditure in various sectors, etc. have been
used as control variables. Appendix 4 contains brief explanation of these variables including
4

In Nepal, the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission, a government agency in fiscal decentralization evaluates
performance assessments of all LBs every year. The unconditional capital grant for the LBs is based on the
assessment results. Those LBs receiving the highest scores obtain the greater grant and vice versa.
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the data sources. For the measurement of fiscal decentralization, an index of expenditure
decentralization, an index of revenue decentralization and a dummy variable (DV) for the
LSGA have been used. Definition of these indices has been included in Appendix 5.
The average annual per capita GDP growth can be derived using a simple linear regression
equation applying variables of fiscal decentralization and economic controls represented as
district characteristics. The growth regression is written as;
Yit  a0  1Fiscal Decentralizationit  2 EconomicControlsit   it

where the indices i and t denote districts and years, respectively; Y represents average annual
per capita district agricultural GDP growth as proxy by growth of district GDP per capita.
Economic control variables consist of district characteristics. GDP growth is subject to many
influences beyond fiscal decentralization. In order to control for these influences, a set of
control variables have been used to improve the robustness of the result. Most of these
control variables are similar to those used in studies like Barro (1990), Levine and Renelt
(1992), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) and Aki and Sakta (2002).
These control variables are - Own Source Revenue (OSR), population, primary school
enrollment rate, number of primary schools, grant, capital expenditure and the political
violence. The measurement of fiscal decentralization is captured by an index of either
expenditure decentralization or revenue decentralization and a dummy for the LSGA,
meaning that, the LSGA has empowered the Local Bodies in all aspects. Before the LSGA, it
was assumed that the Local Bodies were not able to use the fiscal powers, functions and
functionaries. The parameters α0 is scalar, β represent parameter vectors, and εi is an error
term, which is normally distributed, homoscedastic, and independent across observations.
The use of data with time-series and cross-section dimensions enables consideration of
district-speciﬁc characteristics. Time series data for each district in cross-district regression
analysis can better capture the dynamics of relationships between fiscal decentralization and
district economic growth. The panel data allow more flexibility in modeling.
All the control variables except political violence have been converted into logs. In order to
deal with possible endogeneity problems, control variables were measured at 1996 levels for
pre-fiscal decentralization period (before LSGA) and 1999 levels for the post fiscal
decentralization period (after LSGA). "The control variables (with the exception of the initial
level of dependent variable) determine the steady state growth rate. The initial level variables
11
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provide information on the dynamic adjustment to the steady state (Hammod and Tosum,
2009). "
4. Regression Results and Analysis
To identify whether fiscal decentralization is sensitive to economic growth or not, this study
estimates a number of models. In all the models (Appendix 7), the coefficients of fiscal
decentralization including a dummy for the LSGA, have been found to be statistically
significant and positive. To test the effect of fiscal decentralization on the GDP growth, the
revenue and expenditure decentralization variables have been introduced into the regression
as alternate independent variables.

A dummy for the LSGA has been included in all

regressions. In primary finding, the estimated coefficient on fiscal decentralization is positive
and statistically significant at 1% level. This provides evidence that fiscal decentralization
contributes to economic growth. For example, in the first model, the estimate, 1.61 (see
Appendix 7.1) implies that other things being unchanged, the growth rate of per capita
district GDP should rise by 1.61 percentage points in response to one percent increase in the
degree of fiscal decentralization.
Three types of models have been estimated. In the first type (1st to 10th), the per capita
expenditure on education, health, road, drinking water and sanitation, agriculture and
livestock and others have been used in addition to other control variables. However, in the
second type (11th -14th), the per capita expenditure on education, health, etc. related
variables have not been included. In the third type of models (15th - 20th), some variables
have been lagged by one year to make the models more robust. Two variables, namely, the
per capita expenditure on agriculture and the per capita expenditure on drinking water, are
statistically significant in all models. The coefficient of the per capita expenditure on drinking
water is positive, however, the coefficient of the per capita expenditure on agriculture is
negative. In robustness checks models, the coefficient of the per capita expenditure on
education has been positive and statistically significant at 5% level. It concludes that per
capita expenditure on education and per capita expenditure on drinking water enhances the
district economic growth.

The coefficient of per capita expenditure on agriculture is

negative. However, the impact is negligible. In per capita expenditure on health and per
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capita expenditure on “other”5, the impact is insignificant. In none of the models, the per
capita capital expenditure variable is significant. In robustness check models, the coefficient
of this variable is positive and statistically significant. The OSR and DV (dummy variable for
the LSGA) have been used in all models, where the coefficients of these variables are
statistically significant at 1% level. The political violence and population variables have been
used in different 17 models. In none of the models, they are significant. Likewise, in none of
the models the primary school is significant. In robustness models, the coefficient of primary
school enrollment rate is positive and statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels
respectively. The key finding is that fiscal decentralization is positively affecting district per
capita agriculture GDP growth; i.e. the proxy of per capita GDP growth. The Hausman test
results indicate that the random effect estimator is inconsistent in all the models, so all the
reported results are from fixed effect model specifications.
Theory suggests that a close match between revenue and expenditure assignments at LGs
level helps improve allocative, productive, and fiscal efficiency and hence enhances the
economic growth. The finding matches the theory. The positive association between fiscal
decentralization and district real per capita GDP growth is consistent with the propositions of
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1993,1997, 1999), Huther and Shah (1996),Akai
and Sakata (2002), Lin and Liu (2000), Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. (2001,2003,2005),
Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005), Stansel (2005), Iimi (2005), Liu (2007) and Gyanwaly
and Devkota (2012).

5

Including the areas as explained above, there are a number of other expenditure assignment areas for DDCs
such as social security, natural disasters, sports, soil erosion and river control, environment, forest, culture, land
reform management, etc. Therefore, for this paper per capita expenditure in “other” represent per capita capital
expenses in those sectors excluding education, health, road, agriculture, drinking water and sanitation.
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5. Policy Implications

Fiscal decentralization has been an integral part of overall public sector reform in a number
of countries, both developed and developing including Nepal. It consists primarily of reassigning expenditure functions and revenue sources to lower tiers of government. This paper
has addressed the evolving patterns of fiscal decentralization and impact of fiscal
decentralization on per capita GDP economic growth in the districts of Nepal.
The enactment of LSGA is an important milestone for local governance in Nepal. It has
empowered LBs for enhancing capital expenditure in a range of social and economic sectors
for delivering social services at local level. A dummy variable of the LSGA has positive
impact in the GDP economic growth. The fiscal decentralization is significantly enhancing
the GDP economic growth in the districts of Nepal. Therefore, the process of fiscal
decentralization is beneficial to the economy of Nepal. The policy implication of this paper
has been highlighted as follows;
a) The district economic growth is possible through capital investment in socioeconomic sectors and augmenting the basic service delivery. It would include policy
intervention for increasing capital expenditure and improving service delivery at the
local level.
b) The areas of capital expenditures of the DDCs are imbalanced. They are spending a
greater portion of capital budget on roads. Smaller portion of budget goes to the other
sectors like education, health, agriculture, etc. Therefore, policy instrument should
seek to allocate capital expenses proportionately in all sectors on demand basis
coming through the citizen participation.
c) The LSGA has provided the DDCs with many financial powers, which they are not
utilizing properly. As a result, dependency on central grant is increasing. A hard
budget constraint policy is needed so that the DDCs would be compelled to
generating more revenues on their own sources.
d) The regression result shows that capital expenditure on education, drinking water and
sanitation is enhancing the GDP economic growth in districts. On this ground, a
strategic and implementable policy would have to be designed to promote these
sectors on which the DDCs and other stakeholders are willing to invest more.
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e) The empirical analysis results of primary school enrollment rate is also positively
enhancing the GDP economic growth in districts. This calls for an effective policy
that would support increase the primary school enrollment rate, investment in primary
school buildings, trained teachers, furniture, teaching materials and other programs
motivating the children and deprived people for the enrollment.
f) The fiscal decentralization indices, derived from the total district expenditure and
revenue, are positively affecting the GDP economic growth in the districts. This does
not mean that higher indices are inducing the GDP economic growth. There is direct
and positive functional relationship between the GDP economic growth and revenue
and expenditure. Therefore, the DDCs must be encouraged to increase their overall
revenue and expenditure.
g) In Nepal's fiscal decentralization history, the LSGA is a milestone document. The
impact of LSGA is positive in the GDP economic growth in the districts of Nepal.
However, there are a number of other sectoral acts and regulations conflicting with
the LSGA, which need amendment for its smooth functioning.

6. Conclusion
The LSGA (1999) is a major attempt to implement the fiscal decentralization in Nepal. It
gives Local bodies greater political, administrative and financial powers to lead, facilitate,
and manage the local development affairs effectively.
The impact of fiscal decentralization on the growth of per capita GDP of the districts of
Nepal is the central focus of this paper that has addressed the evolving patterns of fiscal
decentralization in Nepal. The time series data at the district level related to economic
growth, per capita income, etc. are not available. Therefore, district agriculture per capita
GDP growth has been taken as the proxy for per capita GDP growth. The revenue and
expenditure indices have been used as the fiscal decentralization variables. The paper also
uses a dummy variable for the Local Self Governance Act (LSGA) as a fiscal decentralization
variable.
For the sampling purpose panel data set of 20 District Development Committee (DDCs) for a
period of three years before and a period of three years after the enactment of LSGA has been
used. For the control variables; primary school enrollment rate, number of primary schools,
population, real per capita grant and the per capita capita expenditure and political violence
15
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have been used. Using altogether 20 models, the null hypothesis has been clearly rejected, as
the Hausman Test tends to favor a fixed effect specifications and the result suggests that the
random effects estimator is inconsistent. The coefficient of fiscal decentralization is found to
be statistically significant and positive in the estimated models. Adopting empirical analysis
slightly different from the approach employed in other similar studies, the estimation results
of this paper show that the influence of fiscal decentralization is positive to the growth of per
capita GDP of the districts of Nepal .
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : Functional areas (expenditure assignments) of Local Bodies
DDCs
a) Agriculture
(1) To make District level policy on
agriculture and livestock development, and
formulate and operate programmes in
consonance therewith, and inspect and
monitor, and cause to be inspected and
monitored, the programmes operated.
(2) To arrange for, and cause to be
arranged for the seeds, fertilizers and other
agricultural inputs required in the District.
(3) To provide, and cause to be provided,
the services relating to agriculture
extension in the district development area.
(4) To promote, and cause to be promoted,
the agricultural Haat markets and fairs.
(5) To manages and cause to be managed,
the markets for agricultural products.

VDCs

Municipality

(1) To carry out or cause to be
carried
out
agricultural
development programmes within
the village development area.
(2) To arrange for agricultural
Haats (weekly temporary market
for agricultural goods) and fairs
or to assist in organizing such
fairs
within
the
village
development
area.
(3) To operate or cause to be
operated veterinary hospitals, as
per necessity, for the prevention
and control of animal diseases
within the village development
area, and to arrange or cause to be
arranged for pasture areas, as
required, for cattle grazing.
b)Drinking Water and Sanitation and Habitation Development

(1) To arrange for animal slaughter
houses.
(2) To arrange or cause to be
arranged for Haat bazaar (weekly
market),
markets,
fairs
and
exhibitions
etc.

(1) To formulate and implement, and cause
to be implemented drinking water
programs/projects which are to benefit the
people in more than one village
development committees in the district
development area.
(2) To formulate plans on habitation and
market development in rural areas of the
district development area, and implement
and cause to be implemented them.

(1) To prepare drinking water
projects for the supply of drinking
water required within the village
development
area
and
to
implement and operate the same,
and to arrange or cause to be
arranged for their maintenance.
(2) To construct, maintain and
repair or cause to be constructed,
maintained and repaired wells,
ponds, taps etc. within the village
development
area.
(3) To preserve or cause to be
preserved the sources of water
within the village development
area.

(1) To preserve rivers, streams,
ponds, wells, lakes, stone watertaps etc. and utilize, or cause to be
utilized
them
properly.
(2) To carry out or cause to be
carried out sanitation programmes
in the Municipality area.
(3) To carry out and manage or
cause to be carried out and managed
the acts of collection, transportation
and disposal of garbage and solid
wastes.

c)Hydropower
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DDCs
(1) To formulate, implement, operate,
distribute and maintain and repair projects
on mini and micro hydropower and other
energy, and cause to be done the same

VDCs
(1) To generate and distribute
electricity and to cause to be
generated and distributed the
same.

Municipality
(1) To generate and distribute or
cause to be generated and
distributed electricity in the
Municipality area.

(1) To prepare projects on tracks
and trails, and rural roads
required within the village
development
area
and
to
implement the same and make
arrangement
for
their
maintenance
and
repair.
(2) To maintain and repair
bridges,
twines,
Ghats
(embankments) and culverts
handed over by various agencies.

(1) To prepare plans of unpitched
and pitched roads, bridges and
culverts as needed within the
Municipality area, except those
roads which are under the
responsibility and control of His
Majesty’s
Government,
and
construct, maintain and repair or
cause to be constructed, maintained
and repaired, the same.
(2) To arrange or cause to be
arranged for bus parks and parking
places
of
rickshaws
(threewheelers), horse-carts, trucks etc.
within the Municipality area.
(3) To prescribe the upper limit of
push-carts, rickshaws, horse-carts
etc. in consideration of transport
requirement of the Municipality and
register and provide number to
them.

(d) Works and Transport
(1) To prepare a master plan of districtlevel roads in the district development area
and get it approved by the District Council.
(2) To build, operate, monitor, evaluate and
maintain and repair the approved District
level roads, and cause to be done the same.
(3) To formulate, build and maintain and
repair the plans of suspension bridges
required in the district development area,
and cause to be done the same.
(4) To make necessary arrangements on the
means of transport to be operated within
the district development area.
(5) To give license to “D” class contractors
and cancel and renew it pursuant to the
prevailing law.
(6) To develop and promote the waterways and ropeways.

(e) Land Reforms and Land Management
(1) To protect and promote the Ailani
(unregistered) land and governmental
barren land situated within the district
development area.

(1) To protect barren and
governmental unregistered (Ailani)
land in the Municipality area.

f) Development of Women and Helpless People (Women, Children and Social Welfare)
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DDCs
(1) To prepare and implement a plan
required for the upliftment of the women in
the district development area.
(2) To carry out acts on the protection of
the orphans, helpless women, the aged,
disabled and incapacitated persons as per
the national policy, and to carry out or
cause to be carried out acts on the wiping
out of social ill-practices and the protection
of the girls and women
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VDCs
(1) To maintain the inventory of
the helpless, orphan and disabled
children within the village
development area and to make
arrangements for keeping them in
appropriate place.
(2) To prepare necessary plans
for the upliftment of women
within the village development
area and to implement the same.
(3) To carry out activities
regarding the protection of orphan
children, helpless women, aged
and
old,
disabled
and
incapacitated persons in line with
the national policy and to carry
out or cause to be carried out acts
regarding the wiping out of social
ill-practices and the protection of
girls and women.

Municipality
(1) To arrange, or cause to be
arranged, for cremation of heirless
dead person, and to make
arrangements for orphanages for
helpless people, orphans and
children bereaved of parents.
(2) To carryout, or cause to be
carried out, programmes relating to
the interests and welfare of the
women and children and acts
relating to the control of immoral
profession and trade.
(3) To maintain inventory of the
helpless, orphan and disabled
children within the Municipality
area and arrange to keep them in
appropriate place.

(1) To afforest or have
afforestation in barren land, hills,
steppe and steep land and in
public land.
(2) To prepare programmes in
respect of forests, vegetation,
biological diversity and soil
conservation and to carry out or
cause to be carried out the same.
(3) To make various programmes
on environment protection and to
carry out or cause to be carried
out the same.

(1) To assist, or cause to be
assisted, in environment protection
acts by controlling water, air and
noise pollution to be generated in
the Municipality area.
(2) To protect or cause to be
protected the forests, vegetation and
other natural resources within the
Municipality area.
(3) To do plantation on either side
of the roads and other necessary
places in the Municipality area.
(4) To determine and manage
places for keeping pinfolds and
animal slaughter house.

g) Forest and Environment
(1) To prepare plans on forests, vegetation,
biological diversity and soil conservation,
and implement and cause to be
implemented the same.
(2) To protect and promote, and cause to be
protected and promoted, the environment

h) Education and Sports
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DDCs
(1) To set priority for establishing schools
in the district development area and make
recommendation for their establishment.
(2) To make recommendation, setting out
rationale and reasons, for the approval and
dissolution of the schools in the district
development area.
(3) To supervise and monitor the schools
in the district development area and assist
in their operation and management.
(4) To formulate policies and programmes
on the District level adult education as well
as informal education.
(5) To set programmes relating to sports
and physical development, and implement
and cause to be implemented them.
(6) To form a District level sports
development committee.

VDCs
(1) To establish pre-primary
schools with own source, to give
permission to establish them and
to operate and manage the same.
(2) To supervise and manage the
schools being operated within the
village
development
area.
(3) To assist in providing primary
level education in mother tongue
within the village development
area.
(4) To make programmes on
adult education and informal
education and to carry out or
cause to be carried out the same.
(5) To establish and operate or
cause to be established or
operated
libraries.
(6) To formulate plans on the
development of sports and to
implement the same, and to
extend
support
to
the
development of sports by
constituting village level sports
development
committee.
(7) To make arrangements for
providing scholarships to the
students of oppressed ethnic
communities who are extremely
backward on economic point of
view.

i) Relating to Wages for Labour
(1) To determine rate of wages for labour
and rate of workmanship at the district
level.
(2) To set and operate programmes on
abolition of child labour and rescue of the
children
j) Irrigation and Soil-erosion and River Control

Municipality
(1) To establish, operate and
manage pre-primary schools with
own source in the Municipality area
and give permission to establish the
same.
(2) To extend
supports in the operation and
management of schools being
operated within the Municipality
area and to make recommendations
for
the
establishment
and
dissolution of such schools.
(3) To assist in providing primary
level education in mother tongue
within the Municipality area.
(4) To make arrangements for
providing scholarships to the
students of oppressed ethnic
communities who are extremely
backward on economic point of
view.
(5) To prepare and implement or
cause
to
be
implemented
programmes on Municipality level
adult education and informal
education.
(6) To open, operate and manage or
cause to be opened, operated and
managed, libraries and reading halls
in
the
Municipality
area.
(7) To prepare and implement or
cause to be implemented, sports
development
programmes.
(8) To develop or cause to be
developed sports by constituting
Municipality
level
sports
development committee.
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DDCs
(1) To formulate, implement, operate and
maintain and repair programmes on
irrigation, ditch, embankment, and small
ditch providing facility to more than one
village development area in the district
development area, and cause to be done the
same.
(2) To formulate plans on prevention of
soil- erosion, river cutting etc. in the areas
affected from such acts, and implement and
cause to be implemented the same.
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VDCs
(1) To prepare projects of
irrigation, dams, canals, water
channel, water bank (Pani ghat)
etc. required within the village
development
area
and
to
implement or cause to be
implemented
the
same.
(2) To prepare programmes on
soil-erosion and river control that
affects the village development
area and to implement or cause to
be implemented the same.

Municipality
(1) In the event of necessity to carry
out irrigation plans in the
Municipality area, to make plans
thereof and implement and cause to
be
implemented
the
same.
(2) To control and prevent, or cause
to be controlled and prevented the
possible river-cuttings, floods and
soil erosion in the Municipality
area.

(1)To keep records of population,
houses, land and livestock within
the village development area.
(2) To register birth, death and
other
personal
events
in
accordance with the prevailing
law.

(1) To maintain inventory of
population and houses and land
within the Municipality area.
(2) To register birth, deaths and
other personal events pursuant to
the prevailing law.
(3) To grant approval to open
cinema halls in the Municipality
area.
(4) To up-date the block numbers of
the houses in the Municipality area..

(1) To keep records of culturally and
religiously important places located within
the district development area and to
preserve and promote them by having them
repaired and maintained.
(2) To promote, and cause to be promoted,
various languages, religions and cultures,
(3) To preserve, promote and use, and
cause to be preserved, promoted and used,
the archaeological objects, languages,
religion, art and culture within the district
development area.
(m) Cottage Industry

(1) To keep records of religious
places and rest houses, inns,
shelters etc. within the village
development area and to look
after and preserve them or cause
to be done the same.
(2) To preserve or cause to be
preserved various languages,
religions and cultures and assist
in their development.

(1) To prepare an inventory of the
culturally and religiously important
places within the Municipality area
and maintain, repair, protect and
promote, or cause to be maintained,
repaired, protected and promoted,
them.
(2) To protect,
promote and use or cause to be
protected, promoted and used,
archaeological objects, languages,
religion and culture within the
Municipality area.

(1) To maintain records of the cottage
industries to be establish within the district
development area.
(2) To identify and develop an industrial
zone in the district.

(1) To act as a motivator for
carrying out cottage industries in
the village development area.

(1) To act or cause to act as a
motivator to the promotion of
cottage,
small
and
medium
industries in the Municipality area.

(k) Information and Communications
(1) To maintain data of the district
development area.
( 2) To give approval to set up cinema halls
in the district development area except the
Municipality area.
(2) To open district level libraries, reading
rooms and information centers in other
rural areas except the Municipality area in
the district development area.

(l) Language and Culture

(n) Health Service
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DDCs
(1) To operate and manage, and cause to be
operated and managed, the district level
health
posts,
hospitals,
Ayurvedic
dispensaries, health centres, health offices
etc.
(2) To formulate and implement the
programmes such as family planning,
mother
child
welfare,
extensive
vaccination, nutrition and population
education and public health.
(3) To give approval to open sub-health
posts in the village development areas
under the district development area and
inspect and monitor them.
(4) To make arrangements for the supply
of such medicines and materials and
equipment relating to treatment as required
for the district development area, and
inspect and monitor the quality standards
thereof.
(5) To prohibit or remove the public use of
the things injurious to the public health in
the district development area.
(6) To prohibit the sale, distribution and
consumption of such consumable goods as
may cause adverse impacts on the public
health.

VDCs
(1) To operate and manage
village level health centre, health
post and sub-health posts.
(2) To prepare programmes on
primary health education and
sanitation and disposal of wastes
and garbages in the village
development
area
and
to
implement
the
same.
(3) To provide assistance in the
development and expansion of
herbs.
(4) To launch programmes on
family planning and maternity
and child care.

Municipality
(1) To operate and manage, or cause
to be operated and managed,
municipal
level
hospitals,
Ayurvedic dispensaries and health
centers.
(2) To
open, operate and manage, or cause
to be operated and managed, health
posts and sub-health posts within
the
Municipality
area.
(3) To formulate programmes
relating to family planning, mother
and child welfare, extensive
vaccination, nutrition, population
education and public health, and to
implement or cause to be
implemented
the
same.
(4) To arrange, or cause to be
arranged,
for
prevention
of
epidemics and infectious diseases.
(5) To ban the public use of such
things and objects in the
Municipality area as are harmful to
the public health or remove the
same.
(6) To ban the sale, distribution and
consumption of such type of
consumer goods which may cause
adverse effects on public health.

(1) To preserve, develop and
expand tourist areas and to make
or cause to be made arrangements
for preventing pollution in such
places.

(1) To protect, promote, expand and
utilize or cause to be protected,
promoted, expanded and utilized,
natural, cultural and tourists
heritage within the Municipality
area.

o) Tourism
(1) To protect, promote, expand and utilize
the natural, cultural, historical and touristic
heritages in the district development area,
and cause to be done so.

(p) Physical Development
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VDCs
(1)
To
build
community
buildings, rest houses and public
toilets.
(2) To prepare criteria for houses,
buildings, roads and other
physical infrastructures etc. to be
constructed within the village
development area, and to grant
approval as prescribed for the
construction
of
them.
(3) To formulate land-utilization
plans of the village and to
implement or cause to be
implemented
the
same.
(4) To make or cause to be made
arrangements
for
necessary
sewerage and drainage in
settlement areas.

Municipality
(1) To frame land-use map of the
Municipality area and specify and
implement or cause to be
implemented,
the
industrial,
residential, agricultural, recreational
areas etc.
(2) To prepare housing plan in the
area of Municipality and implement
or cause to be implemented the
same.
(3) To carryout plans on drinking
water and drainage in the areas of
Municipality and operate, maintain
and repair or cause to be operated,
maintained and repaired the same.
(4) To develop, or cause to be
developed, green zones, parks and
recreational areas in various places
in
the
Municipality
area.
(5) To arrange for, or cause to be
arranged for, public toilets in
various places in the Municipality
area.
(6) To approve or cause to be
approved designs of houses,
buildings etc. to be constructed in
the areas of the Municipality.
(7) To build community building
and rest houses.

(1) To prepare annual budgets,
plans and programmes of the
VDC and submit them to the
VDC Council.
(2) To keep the accounts of
incomes and expenditures, and
other
documents
pertaining
thereto in an up-dated manner.
(3) To expend the money to
execute the decisions of the
council subject to the limits of the
approved budget and get them
audited
timely.
(4) To raise taxes, charges and
fees etc. approved by the Council
by remaining within the legal
framework.
5. Having the Local Bodies
oriented towards establishing the
civil society based democratic
process, transparent practice,
public
accountability,
and
people's participation, in carrying
out the functions devolved on
them.

(1) To prepare annual budgets,
plans and programmes of the
Municipality and submit them to
the Municipal Council.
(2) To keep the accounts of incomes
and expenditures, and other
documents pertaining thereto in an
up-dated
manner.
(3) To expend the money to execute
the decisions of the Municipality,
subject to the limits of the approved
budget and get them audited timely.
(4) To raise taxes, charges and fees
etc. approved by the Municipal
Council by remaining within the
legal framework. 5. (5) Having the
Local Bodies oriented towards
establishing the civil society based
democratic process, transparent
practice, public accountability, and
people's participation, in carrying
out the functions devolved on them.

(q) Finance
(1) To prepare annual budgets, plans and
programmes of the Ditrict and submit them
to the District Council.
(2) To keep the accounts of incomes and
expenditures, and other documents
pertaining thereto in an up-dated manner.
(3) To expend the money to execute the
decisions of the district council, subject to
the limits of the approved budget and get
tem
audited
timely.
(4) To raise taxes, charges and fees etc.
approved by the District Council by
remaining within the legal framework.
5. Having the Local Body oriented towards
establishing the civil society based
democratic process, transparent practice,
public accountability, and people's
participation, in carrying out the functions
devolved on them.

(r) Legal
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DDCs
(1) To draft the bye-laws of the District
Development Committee and submit it to
the
District
Council.

VDCs
(1) To frame bye-laws of the
Village Development Committee
and submit them to the Village
Council.
(2) Judicial Power related to cases
on border/boundary of land,
public land, boundary walls,
canals, dams, ditches or allocation
of water and encroachment on
roads or way-outs, compensation
for damage of crops, construction
of Houses, local issues on pasture
land, grass, fuel woods, intruding
in private house etc as specified
in Laws

Municipality
(1) To frame bye-laws of the
Municipality and submit it to the
Municipal
Council.

(1) To carry out or cause to be
carried out necessary works in
respect of controlling natural
calamities.
(2) To control immoral activities
like sale and distribution of
intoxicating
substances
and
gambling and playing cards
within the village development
area.

(1) To carry out necessary functions
on the controlling of natural
calamities.
(2) To have trees cut and houses,
walls etc demolished which create
hazardous
results
(3) To impound and auction strayed
animals.
(4) To secure public interest by
killing rabid and strayed dogs and
specify the places to bury dead
animals
and
birds
into.
(5) To arrange for lighting on the
roads and alleys
(6) To operate and manage or cause
to be operated and managed fire
brigades.

(S)Public safety
(1) To carry out necessary actions in
respect of controlling natural calamities.
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DDCs
(n) Miscellaneous:

VDCs

Municipality

(1) To protect the movable and immovable
properties remained under the ownership
and control of the District Development
Committee.
(2) To carry out other functions as
prescribed under the prevailing law.

(1) To develop human resources,
to make arrangements for making
available employment and selfemployment opportunities.
(2) To encourage or cause to be
encouraged
to
carry
out
cooperative,
industrial
and
commercial activities generating
income
to
the
Village
Development Committee with the
investment of private sector as
well.
(3)
To
formulate
various
programmes
based
on
cooperatives and to carry out or
cause to be carried out the same.
(4) To protect movable and
immovable properties which are
under ownership and control of
the
Village
Development
Committee.
(5) To provide assistance for
cooperativeness.
(6) To evaluate the performance
of the Secretary and forward it
with recommendation to the
authority.

(1) To determine and manage
crematoriums.
(2) To confer the honor of
distinguished person of the town on
any
distinguished
person.
(3) To carry out or cause to be
carried out other actions relating to
the
development
of
the
Municipality
area.
(4) To render assistance for the
development
of
cooperative.
(5) To evaluate the performance of
the Secretary and forward it with
recommendation to the authority.
(6) To encourage or cause to be
encouraged
to
carry
out
cooperative,
industrial
and
commercial activities generating
income to the Municipality with the
investment of private sector as well.
(7)
To
formulate
various
programmes
based
on
cooperativeness and to carry out or
cause to be carried out the same.

Source: LSGA (1999).
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Appendix 2 :
Revenue assignments of Local Bodies including intergovernmental fiscal
transfers and borrowings
DDCs

VDCs

Municipality

1. Own Source Revenue
1. Taxes

1. Taxes

1. Land Revenue and House and Land
Tax:
(1) The Municipality may levy house
and land tax, as prescribed, on each
house and land within its jurisdiction
on the basis of the size, type, design,
construction and structure of the house
and compound and area covered by
the house, as approved by the
Municipal Council.

(1) The District Development
Committee may impose tax on
roads, paths, bridges, irrigation,
ditches, ponds etc. built by or
transferred to it, at the rate
approved by the District Council
not exceeding the rate as
prescribed
in
the
district
development area.

(a) House and Land Tax:
Annual house and land tax on
each house and land on the
basis also of size, type, design
and structure of the houses
within the Village Development
Committee.

(2) The District Development
Committee may impose tax on
wool, turpentine, herbs, worn and
torn goods, stones, slates, sand
and bone, horn, wing, leather etc.
of the animals except those
prohibited, pursuant to the
prevailing law and on other goods
as prescribed at the rate approved
by the District Council not
exceeding the rate specified in the
district development area.
(3) Upto 35-50% of the amount
obtained from the tax referred to
in sub-section (2) shall have to be
provided to the concerned Village
Development Committee and the
Municipality.
2. Service Charge: The District
Development Committee may
impose the following service
charge at the rate approved by the
District Council not exceeding the
rate as prescribed in its area:(a) The service charge of the guest
house, library clinic, hermitage,
city hall etc. built by it or under its
custody.

(b)Land Revenue or Land Tax:
Land revenue or land tax on the
land
within
the
village
development area.
Provided that the twenty-five
per cent amount of revenue
raised from land revenue or
land tax shall have to be handed
over
to
the
District
Development Committee.

(2) The Municipality may impose land
revenue and land tax as prescribed on
the land within the municipal area.

(c) Haat (temporary weekly
bazaar) Market Shop Tax: Haat
market shop tax for shops kept
in livestock Haat and regular
Haat market, fair, fete etc.
organized within the village
development area.

2. Rent Tax : (1) The Municipality
may collect rent tax, as prescribed, on
the amount of rent in cases where any
house, shop, garage, storage, stall,
shed, factory, land or pond within its
jurisdiction is rented wholly or partly.

(d) Vehicle Tax: Vehicle
registration and annual vehicle
tax on the prescribed vehicles
within the village development
area and occasional vehicle tax
on all kinds of vehicles entering
into its area.
Provided that on the prescribed
vehicles entered into the
Kingdom of Nepal, the Village
Development Committee of
such village development area,
through which area such
vehicle enters into at first from
any foreign country, may levy

(2) The Municipality may impose rent
or tenancy charges, as prescribed, on
temporary shops permitted to be kept
at the market places, public places,
unregistered land or road-sides
constructed, supervised or operated by
it within its jurisdiction. Provided that
no permanent shop shall be allowed to
be constructed in a manner to obstruct
the public movement and sanitation.
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tax as prescribed and after
payment of tax within one
village development area, such
tax shall not be levied again in
other places.

(b) The service charge of the
ditch, small ditch, embankment
etc. built by it.

(e)
Entertainment
Tax:
Entertainment tax may be
levied as prescribed on the
places of entertainment such as
permitted cinema-hall, videohall, cultural-show hall located
within the village development
area.

3. Enterprise Tax: The Municipality
may levy and collect enterprise tax, as
prescribed, on trade, profession or
occupation within its jurisdiction on
the basis of capital investment and
financial transactions.

(c) Local development fees.

(f) Rent and Tenancy (Bitauri)
Tax: Rent and tenancy tax on
the temporary shops given on
rent at the Haat market places
constructed, supervised or
operated by itself or at
unregistered (Ailani) land or
road sides, within the village
development area.
(g)
Advertisement
Tax:
Advertisement tax on sign
boards placed within the village
development area.

4. Vehicle Tax: The Municipality may
levy vehicle registration and annual
vehicle tax on the prescribed vehicles
within its jurisdiction and occasional
vehicle tax, as prescribed, on all kinds
of vehicles entering into its area.

3. Fee: The District Development
Committee may impose the
following fees at the rate
approved by the District Council
not exceeding the rate as
prescribed in its area:

(h) Business Tax: Business tax
on the prescribed industry,
trade, profession or occupation
within the village development
area.

6.
Entertainment
Tax:
The
Municipality may levy entertainment
tax, as prescribed, on the means of
entertainment such as cinema halls,
video-halls,
cultural-show
halls
permitted within the municipal area.

(a) Fees for licence and renewal
thereof, for carrying out water
course, conducting boats and
tunings and fishing.

(i) Commercial Video Tax:
Commercial video tax within
the village development area.

7. Commercial Video Tax: The
Municipality may levy tax as
prescribed on the video, projector,
cable etc. used by any person or
organization for commercial purpose.

(b) Fees for registration
Panighat and renewal thereof.

(j) Natural
Resources
Utilization Tax: Tax to be
levied
for
commercial
exploitation
of
natural
resources and heritage within
the village development area.

8.
Advertisement
Tax:
The
Municipality may levy tax on
signboards, globoards, stalls etc.
permitted to be placed on roads,
junctions, public places in its area for
advertisement, publicity etc.

(k)To levy other taxes as
prescribed.

9. Parking Charge: The Municipality
may impose parking charge, as
prescribed, at vehicles parking places
managed by it.

(d) Other
prescribed.

service

charge

(c) Fees for recommendation.

as

of

27

5. Property Tax: The Municipality
may levy an integrated property tax,
within its jurisdiction at the prescribed
rate.
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(d) Other fees as prescribed.

2. Service charge
(1) The Village Development
Committee may impose the
service charges as follows at
the rate approved by the Village
Council, for the services made
available by it within its area:(a)
Service
charge
on
sanitation,
drainage
and
sewerage.

10. Service Charge: (1) Any
Municipality may impose service
charge for making available the
facilities such as drinking water,
electricity, water-tap, public telephone
and similar other facilities.

(b) Tourist places entrance
charge.

(3) The Municipality may collect
service charges from the persons using
facilities such as public toilets, parks,
bathrooms,
swimming
pools,
gymnasiums, guest houses, tourist
places, hostels, market places,
slaughter
houses,
crematorium,
laundry ghat (bank of a river) and
similar other facilities, for making
available such facilities.
(4) The Municipality may, with the
prior approval of Government, carry
out the act of providing the facilities
referred to in sub-sections (1), (2) or
(3) and collecting the service charges
therefor through the private sector or
by making the private sector as well
participate therein.

4. Sale: The District Development
Committee may sell, as prescribed
the sand in the rivers and canals,
roda, stones, soil, wood swept by
river, etc. lying in its area. Out of
the proceeds of such sale of
goods, upto 35-50% amount shall
have to be provided to the
concerned Village Development
Committee and the Municipality.
5.Revenue
sharing
:The
concerned District Development
Committee shall be entitled to the
amount as prescribed out of the
following amounts:-

(2) The Municipality may impose
service charges for solid wastes
management,
sanitation,
sewerage/drainage
etc.
facilities
provided by it in the municipal area.

(a) Registration fees to be
obtained by Government for the
purchase and sale of house and
land.

(c) Entrance charge on parks,
garden, picnic places and view
towers etc.

(b) Amount to be obtained by
Government for royalty of mines,
petroleum products, forests, water
resources, and other natural
resources.

(d) Charge for performing
entertainment activities like
magic and circus.

(5) The Municipality may determine
the expenditures required to repair and
maintain the roads, sewerage, bridges,
pavements,
courtyards,
alleys,
drainage, electricity etc. constructed
by it and collect the same from the
concerned consumers annually.

(c) Entrance fee to be obtained by
Government for entry of tourists
into the district development area.

(2) The Village Development
Committee may impose and
collect service charge on the
amount realized by it for
somebody else, if it realizes and
recovers any other's amount
and goods.

(6) The Municipality may collect
service charge as prescribed in
valuating the immovable property of
any person.
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3. Fees
The Village Development
Committee may charge fees as
follows within its area at the
rate approved by the Village
Council, not exceeding the
prescribed rate:
(a) Licensing and renewal fee
for television, video and other
equipment.
(b) Approval (Baksauni) fee.
(c) Recommendation fee.
4. Sell : The Village
Development Committee may
sell the following objects
situated within its area:(a) Soil of governmental barren
land, (b) Products of public
ponds or gardens, (c) Assets of
the
Village
Development
Committee, (d) Among the
forest products situated within
the village development area,
dried timber, fire woods,
branches, splints, twigs, roots
etc, (e) Straw, grass etc.

(7) The Municipality may impose fees
for
approval
(Baksauni)
and
recommendation fees in its area, at the
rate approved by the Municipal
Council, not exceeding the prescribed
rate

1) The Government shall have
to provide the VDC each year
with minimum grant prescribed
and also with additional grants
on such basis as population,
level
of
development,
possibility and capability of
mobilizing revenues, necessity
of financial resources, regular
record keeping of incomes and
expenditures,
situation
of
auditing and financial discipline
of VDC

1) The Government shall have to
provide the Municipality each year
with minimum grant prescribed and
also with additional grants on such
basis as population, level of
development,
possibility
and
capability of mobilizing revenues,
necessity of financial resources,
regular record keeping of incomes and
expenditures, situation of auditing and
financial discipline of Municipality

1) The Village Development
Committee may raise loan or
borrow money as approved by
the Village Council, with or
without pledging any movable
and immovable property under
the ownership and possession
of
Village
Development
Committee or under the
guarantee of Government, from
a
bank
or
any
other
organization or institution.

1) The Municipality may raise loans,
with or without pledging any property
under its ownership and possession or
under
guarantee
given
by
Government, from a bank or any other
organization, according to the policy
approved by the Municipal Council.

2. Grants
1) The Government shall have to
provide the DDC each year with
minimum grant prescribed and
also with additional grants on
such basis as population, level of
development, possibility and
capability of mobilizing revenues,
necessity of financial resources,
regular record keeping of incomes
and expenditures, situation of
auditing and financial discipline
of DDC
3. Loan ( Borrowings)
1) The District Development
Committee may raise loans, or
receive borrowings with or
without pledging any of its
movable and immovable property
owned and possessed by it or
under guarantee given by His
Majesty's Government, from a
bank or any other organization,
according to the policy adopted by
the District Council.

Source : LSGA (1999 ) .
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Appendix 3 : Sampled DDCs
S.N.

1

2

3

4

5
Total

Development
Region ( DR)

Ecological
Region
Terai

Number of
districts
5

Name of districts selected
for the study
Jhapa

Hill

8

Khotang and Dhankuta

Mountain

3

Taplegunj

Terai

7

Sarlahi

Hill

9

Kathmandu and
Makawanpur

Mountain

3

Dolkha

Terai

3

Rupadehi

Hill

11

Gulmi and Lamgunj

Mountain

2

Mustanj

Terai

3

Banke

Hill

7

Jajarkot and Salyan

Mountain

5

Mugu

Terai

2

Kanchanpur

Hill

4

Acham and Dadeldhura

Mountain

3

Bajura

15

75

20

Eastern DR

Central DR

Western DR

Mid Western
DR

Far Western
DR
5

Number of districts selected for the study

20

% as per the total number of districts

26.67

29.13
Note: Terai, Hill and Mountain comprise 20, 39 and 16 districts respectively.
% as per total population of the country

Source: Field Survey, 2013.
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Appendix 4: Data sources and description of dependent and independent variables

4.1 District Agricultural GDP
District per capita agriculture GDP is derived from the values of output of different
agricultural production. It is used as a proxy for district GDP per capita. The district-wise
segregated data related to all agricultural, livestock and vegetable outputs such as paddy,
maize, millet, wheat, barley, pea, sugarcane, jute, tea, coffee, cardamom, ginger, orange,
tomato, cabbage, goat, buffalo, fish, pig, etc. have been received from the published and
unpublished documents of the Ministry of Agricultural and Cooperatives and the concerned
District Agriculture Offices. The values of the agricultural products have been converted to
the base year's (1996) prices of the concerned districts. The data for prices have been used
from the Market Information Service. This data set has been used only for the estimation
purpose. It has been applied for the dependent variable.
4.2 Population
Population is the one of the important variables used to derive the data in terms of per capita.
In estimation, it has been used as a control variable. The data has been received from the CBS
(1991, 2000, 2011).
4.3 District Revenue
District revenue is the aggregate of revenue collected by the District Development
Committees (DDCs) and the central government. The central government collects tax and
non-tax revenue from its various tax and custom offices in districts and regional offices. The
revenue collected by the central government have been received from the published and
unpublished documents from the Financial Comptroller General Office (FCGO). Further, the
data set for DDC's revenue is received from the concerned DDCs, the Local Bodies Fiscal
Commission Secretariat (LBFCS), Finance and Monitoring section of the Ministry of Federal
Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD). This data set is used to derive the revenue
decentralization index for measuring the measure the fiscal decentralization.

4.4 District Expenditure
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District expenditure is the combination of expenditure incurred by DDCs and the central
government. The district-wise expenditure incurred by central government is received from
the published and unpublished documents of the FCGO. The data set for DDC's expenditure
is received from the concerned DDC, the LBFCS and the Finance and Monitoring section of
MoFALD. This data set is used to derive the expenditure decentralization index for
measuring the fiscal decentralization. This index plays a very important role for the
estimation.
4.5 Number of Primary Schools and Students in Primary Level
Data on community level primary schools have been taken from the published and
unpublished documents/reports from the Department of Education.
4.6 Student Enrollment Rate
Student enrollment rate is derived by dividing the total number of primary students enrolled
in the community schools by the total district population. The categorization of students as
per the age groups at primary level is not available. Therefore, the total size of population has
been used to derive the enrollment rate.

4.7 Expenditure in Social and Economic Sectors
Expenditure in social and economic sectors, namely education, health, road and transport,
agriculture and livestock and drinking water and sanitation, has been highlighted as follows;
a. Road
Road includes the graveled and fair-weather roads constructed by the LBs from their
own development budget, which includes the grants (conditional and unconditional)
and own source revenue including the revenue sharing. The expenditure on road at
the DDCs level is derived from the concerned DDCs and the Ministry of Federal
Affairs and Local Development.

b. Drinking Water Projects, Irrigation and Buildings (Schools, Health Post, Community
infrastructures, etc.): Expenditure by the LBs from their own budget for the
construction of number of drinking water projects, community schools, health and
sub-health posts and community buildings and construction of canals for providing
the land irrigation (in hectors) to the populace has been considered. In road sector, the
sources of data are the same.
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4.8 Conflict (Violence) Data
Conflict data are derived from the sum of murders, abductions and handicapped people from
the state and non-state level violence. The data have been taken from the Informal Sector
Service Center (INSEC).
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Appendix 5: Measurement of Fiscal Decentralization
1. Expenditure Decentralization (ED): This is the ratio of DDCs total expenditure to the
combined government and DDCs expenditure.

EDit 

DDCExpit
DDCExpit  GONExpit

Where, i denotes district i and t denotes year t. DDCExp and GONExp denote the DDCs
and the Government of Nepal (GON) expenditure respectively.

2. Revenue Decentralization (RD): This is the ratio of DDCs total revenue to the
combined government and DDCs total revenues.
RDit 

DDC Re vit
DDC Re vit  GON Re vit

Where, DDCRev and GONRev denote the DDCs and the GON revenue respectively.
FADit 

DDC Exp fromOwn Re vit
DDC Expit  GON Expit

3. Dummy Variable for LSGA (DV): For this paper, the LSGA (1999) is considered as an
operational variable for fiscal decentralization. Therefore, a dummy variable for LSGA has
been used for the estimation purpose. The numbers zero and one indicate values for fiscal
decentralization in pre and post LSGA periods respectively.
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Appendix 6: Dependent and Independent Variables Used in Estimation
Variable

Definition

GDP

It is a proxy for annual growth of per capita agriculture GDP measured in real terms.

Growth

It is measured in annual percentage change.
Revenue decentralization. It is the ratio of DDC’s total revenue to the combined

RD

government and DDCs revenue.
Expenditure decentralization. It is the ratio of DDCs total expenditure to the

ED

combined government and DDCs expenditure.
Dummy Variable for LSGA, 0 and 1 represent value for the fiscal decentralization

DV

for pre-LSGA and post LSGA periods respectively

Pop

Population in number.
Own source revenue collected by the DDCs from their tax and non tax sources. It is

OSR

measured in thousand (Rs).
Number of total primary schools at community level in districts measured at per

PSc

thousand district population.
Number of total primary student enrollment rate at community schools in districts,

PSER

measured at population.

political
violence

Number of massacre, abduction and handicapped people (violence-affected people
during the conflict period) from the state and non-state levels measured in number.
This includes conditional and unconditional grants received from the GON measured

Grant

at per capita terms (in Rs).

CAPEXP This is the total DDC’s capital expenditure measured at per capita terms (in Rs).
PCEdu

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on education (in Rs).

PCH

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on health (in Rs).

PCR

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on road sector (in Rs).

PCAgri

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on agriculture and livestock sector (in Rs).

PCDWS

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on drinking water and sanitation sector (in Rs).

PCOth

Per capita DDCs’ capital expenditure on other sectors (in Rs).

Source : Author, 2013
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Appendix 7.1 : Panel Regression Results
Independent
Variables
RD

1

2

1.61 (4.16)***

ED

3

4

1.63(4.03)***
8.85(4.70)***

5

6

1.60(3.99)***
9.01(4.55)***

7
1.55(3.79)***

8.81(4.48)***

DV

0.10(11.41)***

0.09(10.44)***

0.10(5.17)***

0.09(4.54)***

0.12(5.35)***

0.11(4.78)***

0.10(2.86)***

OSR

0.82 (7.63)***

0.80(7.74)***

0.82(7.25)***

0.80(7.42)***

0.82(7.33)***

0.80(7.49)***

0.81
(7.29)***

PSER

0.16 (0.89)

PSc
POP

-0.10(-0.18)

0.06(0.10)

Grant
CAPEXP
political
violence
PCEdu

0.05(1.18)

PCH

-0.02(-0.51)

PCR

0.04(0.69)

-0.24(-0.40)

-0.07(-0.12)

0.02(0.04)

0.58(1.75)*

0.55(1.60)*

0.38 (0.98)

0.00(0.30)

0.00(0.06)

0.00(0.51)

0.00(0.41)

0.08(1.83)*

0.06(1.23)

0.08(1.82)*

0.03(0.81)

0.06(1.39)

0.04(0.90)

-0.01(-0.36)

-0.02(-0.52)

-0.01(-0.38)

-0.00(-0.22)

-0.00(-0.09)

-0.00(-0.15)

0.03(0.58)

0.04(0.70)

0.03(0.59)

0.00(0.07)

-0.00(-0.01)

0.00(0.05)

-0.05(-1.81)*

-0.05(-1.88)*

PCAgri

-0.05(-1.81)*

-0.05(-1.78)*

-0.05(-1.69)*

-0.05(-1.65)*

-0.05(1.86)**

PCDWS

0.08(2.23)**

0.08(2.08)**

0.09(2.15)**

0.07(1.96)*

0.09(2.30)**

0.08(2.09)**

0.09(2.29)**

PCOth

-0.00(-0.12)

0.00(0.43)

-0.00(-0.16)

0.00(0.39)

-0.01(-0.47)

0.00(0.08)

-0.42(-0.13)

Constant

0.57(2.40)**

0.01(0.09)

1.16(0.36)

-0.32(-0.10)

0.39(0.12)

-1.00(-0.31)

-0.42(-0.13)

F-value
Prob > F
R-sq within
R-sq
between
R-sq overall
Hausman
tests
p-value of
Hausman
test
No of
observations
No of
groups

48.74

51.3

39.15

41.15

36.97

38.74

34.11

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.8282

0.8354

0.8287

0.8357

0.8345

0.8408

0.836

0.0018

0.0764

0

0.0555

0.0181

0.1385

0.0021

0.0001

0.0929

0.0005

0.07115

0.0224

0.1454

0.0048

67.85

127.58

96.12

144.15

71.57

72.82

107.58

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

120

120

120

120

120

120

120

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

Dependent Variable GDP per capita growth. Figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of t-statistic. *,** and ***
indicate variables whose coefficient are significant at the 10 %,5 % and 1 % levels respectively.

Source : Author's calculations, 2013.
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Appendix 7.2 : Panel Regression Results (Continued)
Independent
Variables

8

RD

9

10

1.40(3.37)***

11

12

1.6(3.69)***

13

14

1.63(3.78)***

ED

8.53(4.27)***

DV

0.09(2.65)***

0.07(1.87)**

0.06(1.74)**

0.06(1.72)*

0.05(1.58)*

0.04(1.75)*

0.04(1.76)*

OSR

0.80(7.45)***

0.77(6.92)***

0.77(7.12)***

0.83(8.54)***

0.85(8.96)***

0.85(8.70)***

0.87(9.00)***

PSER

0.14(0.78)

-0.00(-0.00)

-0.02(-0.10)

0.68(1.43)

0.44(0.95)

0.36(1.53)

0.36(1.54)

0.37(1.77)*

0.35(1.75)*

0.20(0.88)

0.25(1.11)

PSc

7.87(3.88)***

9.58(4.35)***

9.44(4.27)***

POP

0.16(0.23)

0.19(0.28)

0.31(0.47)

0.76(1.08)

0.75(1.10)

0.96(1.35)

0.89(1.27)

Grant

0.38(0.99)

0.03(0.08)

0.04(0.09)

0.13(0.24)

0.38(0.70)

0.09(0.18)

0.34(0.62)

-0.17(-0.32)

-0.47(-0.85)

-0.32(-0.57)

-0.55 (-0.97)

0.00(1.09)

0.00(0.97)

0.00(0.45)

0.00(0.50)

-3.21(-0.81)

-3.49(-0.90)

-3.87(-0.97)

-3.98 (-1.02)

CAPEXP
political violence

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.63)

0.00(0.60)

PCEdu

0.06(1.45)

0.05(1.19)

0.08(1.69)*

PCH

-0.00(-0.03)

-0.00(-0.25)

-0.00(-0.15)

PCR

-0.00(-0.03)

0.02(0.38)

0.01(0.32)

PCAgri

-0.05(-1.83)*

-0.05(-1.91)*

-0.05(-1.87)*

PCDWS

0.08(2.09)**

0.08(2.08)**

0.07(1.88)*

PCOth

0.00(0.06)

-0.00(-0.42)

0.00(0.08)

Constant

-1.66(-0.50)

-0.64(-0.19)

-1.80(-0.54)

F-value

35.65

32.33

32.8

50.46

53.56

45.58

47.66

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

R-sq within

0.8419

0.8403

0.8462

0.8144

0.8232

0.8185

0.825

R-sq between

0.0743

0.0009

0.0752

0.0438

0.0064

0.0941

0.0381

R-sq overall

0.0858

0.0037

0.0928

0.0283

0.001

0.0676

0.0194

Hausman tests
p-value of Hausman
test
No of observations

103.25

136.47

401.15

64.07

72.62

126.83

68.14

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

120

120

120

120

120

120

120

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

Prob > F

No of groups

Dependent Variable GDP per capita growth. Figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of t-statistic. *,** and *** indicate
variables whose coefficient are significant at the 10 %,5 % and 1 % levels respectively.

Source; Author's calculations, 2013.
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Appendix 7.3 : Panel Regression Results (Robustness)
Independent
Variables
ED

8.15(4.47)***

DV
OSR

15

16

17

18

8.70(4.72)***

8.06(4.52)***

8.66(4.79)***

9.03(5.03)***

9.04(4.96)***

0.09(10.13)***

0.06(3.74)***

0.08(4.88)***

0.07(3.90)***

0.07(3.97)***

0.07(3.95)***

0.84(8.46)***

0.89(10.28)***

0.80(8.06)***

0.85(9.77)***

0.87(10.02)***

0.87(9.87)***

0.12(3.45)***

0.1(2.18)**

0.10(2.38)***

0.10(2.34)***

0.02(1.09)

0.00(0.31)

0.00(0.24)

0.77(1.45)

0.77(1.44)

Lag PSER

19

20

Lag PSc

0.06(3.15)***

POP

0.95(1.74)*

0.06(0.11)

0.83(1.54)

Lag Grant

0.02(2.12)**

0.03(2.07)**

0.02(1.95)**
0.04(2.36)**

0.04(1.29)

0.00(0.76)

0.00(0.82)

0.00(0.98)

0.00(0.01)

0.00(0.01)

-4.30(-1.50)

-4.07(-1.43)

-4.06(-1.42)

-0.00(-0.04)

Lag CAPEXP
political violence

0.00(0.41)

PCEdu

0.08(1.89)**

0.04(2.09) **

PCH

0.00(0.24)

0.03(1.11)

Lag PCR

0.01(0.24)

-0.01(-0.87)

PCAgri

-0.06 (-2.30)**

-0.05(-1.94)*

PCDWS

0.07(2.04)**

0.07(2.10)**

PCOth

0.00(0.20)

0.00(0.50)

Constant

-0.05 (-0.44)

F-value
Prob > F
R-sq within
R-sq between
R-sq overall
Hausman tests
p-value of Hausman
test
No of observations
No of groups

-5.07 (-1.75)*

-0.23(-0.08)

50.99

71.58

45.35

65.79

67.22

59.1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.8514

0.8449

0.8727

0.8526

0.8553

0.8553

0.083

0.0559

0.0694

0.0442

0.0326

0.0324

0.1001

0.034

0.0877

0.0247

0.0169

0.0167

53.17

89.18

217

81.26

85.56

83.06

0

0

0

0

0

0

119

119

119

119

119

119

20

20

20

20

20

20

Dependent Variable GDP per capita growth. Figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of t-statistic. *,** and ***
indicate variables whose coefficient are significant at the 10 %,5 % and 1 % levels respectively.

Source : Author's calculations, 2013.
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